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VIOLENCE, MASCULINITY AND SELF: KILLING IN JOSEPH ROTH’S 1920S 
FICTION 
Jon Hughes
‘Denn es ist Krieg, wir wissen es, wir, die beeideten Sachverständigen für 
Schlachtfelder, wir haben sofort erkannt, daß wir aus einem kleinen Schlachtfeld in ein 
großes heimgekehrt sind’.1 These words, from Joseph Roth’s short travel book Die 
weißen Städte (1925), may be understood metaphorically to refer to the lasting 
psychological damage inflicted by the First World War upon those who fought and 
survived. For a small number of men, however, armistice in 1918 did not mean an end 
to violence. For these trained soldiers the killing continued, and Europe, at least for a 
few more years, remained a huge potential battlefield. In the Russian Revolution and 
Civil War, in the clashes between Bolsheviks and right-wing volunteers in the eastern 
part of the Reich, in the widespread fighting in 1919, the year of the failed German 
‘Revolution’, in demonstrations, riots, and political assassinations: the War continued. 
For the best part of a decade, Roth, himself a veteran but with no combat experience, 
was concerned with little else in his fiction than the effects of the War upon those who 
survived it. He then turned his attention, in his most famous work Radetzkymarsch 
(1932), to the world which preceded it. In this essay I shall focus on a little considered 
aspect of those earlier novels: Roth’s depiction of killing by War veterans (‘murder’ 
seems to me too tendentious, though doubtless some would prefer it). I shall consider 
the conditions under which the act becomes possible, and argue that the texts 
demonstrate an unsentimental grasp of the continuum of male psychology, and of the 
displacement of the soldier’s ego in military training and combat situations. This 
continuum incorporates at one end modes of behaviour and thought characteristic of 
convinced fascists, but not exclusive to them. Thus I will consider the fascistic 
protagonist of Das Spinnennetz (1923) alongside the revolutionaries in Die Flucht ohne 
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Ende (1927) and  Rechts und Links (1929). The fact that these characters are capable 
of killing does not mean they are to be distinguished absolutely from others in Roth’s 
novels of this period. Rather, the act of killing, as an extreme situation par excellence, 
reveals aspects of character and motivation which otherwise may remain hidden. Many 
of my comments here may be fruitfully applied to other texts featuring soldiers and 
veterans. The parallels and differences in the behaviour of the ex-soldiers and War 
veterans in the three texts on which I focus are explicable without reference to political 
ideology. As Klaus Theweleit observes in his groundbreaking study of the psychology of 
the men of the early German fascist movement, his object of study ‘soll [...] keineswegs 
prinzipiell von den übrigen Männern isoliert werden. [Er] bildet vielmehr so etwas wie 
die Spitze eines Eisbergs von Patriarchalität; was unter der Oberfläche liegt, macht die 
Gewässer aber insgesamt kalt’.2 My concern with regard to Roth’s texts is not just with 
that visible tip of the iceberg, then, but with the cold waters beneath it.  
In his first, apparently unfinished novel Das Spinnennetz (serialised in the 
Viennese Arbeiter-Zeitung in the autumn of 1923), Roth introduces the first of the 
several War returnees in his texts who find it difficult to adjust to demobilisation and a 
civilian career.3 This is of course a well-documented phenomenon after almost any war, 
and was exacerbated in the first years of the Weimar Republic by high levels of 
unemployment, political dissent and the calamitous economic situation, culminating in 
the hyperinflation of 1923.4 The sudden absence of the state of permanent ‘Spannung’, 
in which at any moment one may be required to kill or oneself be killed, to which the 
frontline soldier had become accustomed was, for many, a disorientating experience.5 
Similarly, the disappearance of the camaraderie and routine of army life often resulted 
in a sense of betrayal, compounded of course by the fact that Germany had lost the 
War. A sense of distance from the older generation and particularly from women, who 
had suffered the privations of life at home, but been spared the immediate dangers of 
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total war, was fairly common amongst War veterans. This sense of distance was 
undoubtedly informed in part by a right-wing discourse of gender difference made 
explicit in texts such as Otto Weininger’s Geschlecht und Charakter (1903), which 
posited the physical and ‘spiritual’ superiority of the Western male over ‘weak’ women. 
Many men experienced the War, despite its horrors, as a realm of ‘healthy’ masculinity 
and bonding from which women were excluded. Maurizia Boscagli writes: ‘Women, 
whose bodies signified weakness and passivity, did not fight and remained caught in 
the private sphere of the city apartment and of civilian life’.6 This idea found resonance 
far beyond Germany and those involved in, and at the fringes of, far-right activism. Yet it 
was at these fringes that such concerns festered and deepened with the passage of 
time, and it was there that they became a matter of life and death. Theodor Lohse, the 
central character in Das Spinnennetz, ‘wäre gern sein Leben lang bei der Armee 
geblieben’ (W, IV, 66). In this respect the character anticipates others in Roth’s later 
texts set in a variety of times and locations. The function of the army for these socially 
incompetent men is clear: it provided a sense of wholeness and belonging they lack in 
civilian life. 
In his essay ‘Of Other Spaces’ Michel Foucault analyses certain ‘sites’ he terms 
‘heterotopias’.7 By ‘site’ he understands not a geographical place but an area defined by 
the relationship it provides between certain elements. A heterotopia is what he 
considers a ‘counter-site’ to real space, a kind of realised utopia, a place or situation 
invested with meaning beyond what is physically apparent. In these terms, then, the 
army is precisely such a ‘site’ (defined by the strictly ordered relations between 
soldiers), and would seem to fall under what he terms ‘crisis heterotopias’, under which 
he lists boarding schools and ‘military service for young men’.8 Whereas other 
heterotopic sites, such as theatres and cinemas, saunas, or gardens, may be directly 
linked with mental and physical health, Foucault describes ‘crisis heterotopias’ as 
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‘privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to 
society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis’.9 Bearing in 
mind what I have already said of the attitudes of Lohse and others of his generation, 
Foucault’s account would seem quite accurate. Nor does it seem an exaggeration to 
link, as he goes on to, ‘crisis heterotopias’ with punitive and controlling institutions such 
as psychiatric hospitals and prisons.10 The parallel function of the prison and of the 
military in producing ‘docile’ bodies is a feature of Hermann Ungar’s novella Geschichte 
eines Mordes (1920). The text is narrated by an imprisoned murderer, a sickly and 
perverse man with a pseudo-Nietzschean contempt for all that is ‘weak’ and feminine. 
The following comment reveals the depth of masochistic self-loathing required to thrive 
in any disciplinary/punitive system: 
 
Ich bin nicht unglücklich in diesem Haus und nicht ungeduldig. Ich freue mich der 
Strenge meiner Aufseher, ich freue mich des Zwanges zu Regelmäßigkeit in 
Schlaf, Arbeit, Spaziergang, dem ich unterworfen bin. Ich liebe solch ein Leben 
und manchmal ist mir, als sei ich nicht Sträfling, sondern Soldat, ein einfacher 
gehorchender Soldat, was ich gerne geworden wäre. Ich liebe es, zu 
gehorchen.11 
 
Roth’s understanding of the pernicious psychological power of the military 
machine is evident in the early article ‘Teisinger’ (1920), in which the career soldier is 
likened to a prisoner. Writing about the Austrian Feldmarschalleutnant Teisinger, who 
passed 200,000 sick or injured men as fit for action during the War, he states: 
‘Teisinger mit der moral insanity des zum Pflichtmord und Ehrentod erzogenen 
privilegierten Häftlings in dem großen Kerker des Militarismus ist nicht klagbar, nur zu 
bedauern’ (W, I, 229). As Theweleit suggests, the army was perceived as entirely self-
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sufficient, providing a release from the psycho-sexual tensions and conflicts of the 
family unit, and instilling, through ceaseless drill and exercise, a makeshift sense of 
‘self’ in the physical: in the uniform, but also in skin, muscle and bone. Theweleit writes 
of the satisfaction felt by such ‘soldatische Männer’ in belonging to the 
‘Ganzheitsmaschine Truppe’,12 ‘Teil einer ganzen Maschine zu sein, einer 
Makromaschine, einer Maschine der Macht, in der das Teilchen nicht seine eigene Lust 
besetzt, sondern die des Machthabers erzeugt’.13 In his book Discipline and Punish 
Foucault also analyses the application of ‘discipline’ to the body of the soldier, and the 
manner in which his body becomes the ‘object and target of power’.14 He describes the 
emergence of the army in the eighteenth century as a controlling ‘mechanism’, and 
employs much the same imagery as Theweleit: ‘The human body was entering a 
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it’.15 He is, however, 
less concerned with the individual psychology of the soldier than with the means by 
which he is shaped and controlled, and reduced to a ‘fragment of mobile space’.16 To 
understand Roth’s character it is more useful for us to think in terms of the 
‘Körperpanzer’ adopted by these men, as detected by Theweleit in the writings of such 
fascist and nationalistic writers as Ernst Jünger (who revels in the ‘Stahlgestalt’ of 
soldiers: ‘prächtige Raubtiere’). This psychological ‘armour’ served to hold in check 
everything that was, metaphorically and literally, ‘inside’. With this in mind, then, 
compare the reaction of Anselm Eibenschütz in Das falsche Gewicht (1937) to life 
outside the army: 
 
Er hatte Zivilkleider nicht gern, es war ihm zumute wie etwa einer Schnecke, die 
man zwingt, ihr Haus zu verlassen, das sie aus ihrem eigenen Speichel, also aus 
ihrem Fleisch und Blut, ein viertel Schneckenleben lang gebaut hat. Aber 
anderen Kameraden ging es beinahe ebenso. Die meisten hatten Frauen: aus 
Irrtum, aus Einsamkeit, aus Liebe: Was weiß man! Alle gehorchten den Frauen: 
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aus Furcht und aus Ritterlichkeit und aus Gewohnheit und aus Angst vor der 
Einsamkeit: Was weiß man! (W, VI, 130) 
 
The feminine, the sexual, the emotional are feared and denied by these men, often with 
terrible consequences for themselves and others. Yet Eibenschütz, though displaying 
much the same background as Lohse, is able to occupy, as a civilian in the stable 
bureaucratic hierarchy of the Habsburg empire, a role similar in authoritarian status to 
the soldier’s (an ‘Eichmeister’). In the unstable and flawed system of the Weimar 
Republic, no such surrogate role is available to Lohse. 
     The relatively brief text of Das Spinnennetz documents Theodor’s rejection by his 
family, his antisemitic prejudices (typical for many in his situation and associated with 
the myth of the Bolshevik threat and the ‘Novemberverbrecher’), and his involvement 
with a ‘secret’ far-right group. He works his way rapidly and ruthlessly to a position of 
influence, murdering his superior en route, determined like Hitler during his rise through 
the ranks of the NSDAP (Hitler is mentioned in the text, as is Ludendorff, in an unusual 
mix of the factual and the fictional) to prove that he is a ‘Gefahr’ (W, IV, 103). Robert 
Cohen has characterised Lohse as a ‘weak’ man, ‘der sich unter dem Eindruck seiner 
Bedeutungslosigkeit in wiederkehrende Machtphantasien zurückzieht’.17 We can, 
however, be a good deal more specific about his ‘weakness’ and fantasies. As already 
suggested above, Lohse’s difficulty in adapting to life after the War and outside the 
military is entirely typical of the men of the early fascist movement in Germany, many of 
whom continued the army lifestyle as members of Freikorps units, mercenary 
groupings, and paramilitary organisations such as the nascent SA. Theweleit 
convincingly demonstrates that their vicious campaigns against ‘reds’ in the East, and 
against German communist revolutionaries in charge of the short-lived Soviet-style 
Räterepubliken in Munich and elsewhere, were motivated not so much by politics as the 
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desire and psychological need for acts of violence. As sexual fulfilment is, in practice, 
denied to the soldier whose ego has been transferred entirely to a metaphorical 
‘Körperpanzer’, the existence beneath which of unstructured, fluid (i.e. feminine) desires 
and feelings is vehemently denied, the only ‘lustvoll’ action he is capable of is 
aggression. For Lohse, at the start of Das Spinnennetz, finding an outlet for this 
aggression is a matter of urgency, for he finds himself in the humiliating position (to him, 
that is) of working in precisely the ‘feminine’ ‘private sphere’ mentioned by Boscagli: he 
is a private tutor to a wealthy Jewish family. 
Like the subjects of Theweleit’s study, Lohse remains sexually frustrated. He 
seems caught in a ‘double-bind’ in which he feels sexual urges, but encodes them as 
demeaning and shameful. In an encounter with the homosexual aristocrat Prinz 
Heinrich he allows himself to be literally ‘feminised’ as the object of a man’s lust, an 
episode he subsequently represses. His encounters with prostitutes are also coloured 
by feelings of shame and contamination, of raw lust combined with fear: ‘die kleinen 
Mädchen für billiges Geld, die hastige Minute kalter Liebe im nächtlichen Dunkel des 
Hausflurs, in der Nische, umflattert von der Furcht vor dem zufällig heimkehrenden 
Nachbarn, die Lust, die in der Angst vor dem überraschenden Schritt erlosch’ (W, IV, 
68-69).18 He claims to feel desire only for a woman who is to all intents untouchable to 
him: his employer’s wife, who is upper class, Jewish, and of course married. She is 
described in terms which reflect the ambivalence of this desire, for she seems to 
represent an ‘angelic’ mother/sister figure: ‘Oh, wie war sie gut, schön, jung, Theodor 
hätte sich so eine Schwester gewünscht’ (W, IV, 69). The barely suppressed desire for 
mothering is spelt out by the narrator of Das Spinnennetz, providing as clear an 
indication as we need that Lohse is unlikely to be satisfied by sexual relationships with 
women: ‘Mädchen mit breiten Hüften sind Theodors besondere Lieblinge. Er liebt es, 
Zuflucht und Heimat zu finden im Weibe. Er will nach vollendeter Liebe Mütterlichkeit, 
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weite, breite, gütige. Er will seinen Kopf zwischen großen, guten Brüsten betten’ (W, IV, 
75). 
Thus the only site of genuine lust for Lohse is the act of violence: directed 
against individuals, but also against undifferentiated, fluid ‘bodies’ of people, or crowds. 
Theweleit discerns three ‘Triebziele’ in which the fascist male gains partial satisfaction: 
the reduction of the enemy to ‘blutiger Brei’, the total removal of the enemy (‘entleerter 
Platz’), and the loss of consciousness in the black-out. We find the first of these states 
achieved by Lohse in the aftermath of his cold-blooded murder of his superior, the 
‘detective’ Klitsche, in a forest. The act is more than just a reluctantly executed step 
towards the fulfilment of Lohse’s ambition to lead, as indicated by the language 
employed by the narrator in the aftermath of the murder. Having killed Klitsche with a 
pickaxe Lohse feels something close to exultation: ‘Es war wie ein leichter, roter Jubel, 
ein Triumph, der ihn hob, ein beschwingtes Rauschen, Tod der schweren Gedanken, 
Befreiung der verborgenen, begraben gewesenen Seele’ (W, IV, 91). The parallel with 
Theweleit’s characterisation of this state is quite explicit: ‘Weißgrauer und blutiger Brei 
quoll aus seiner Stirn’ (my italics). By reducing someone else to the condition which he 
most fears - indistinct, liquid mess (what is ‘inside’), Lohse affirms his own survival, the 
solidity of his own externalised ego - hence the triumph. 
The sense of satisfaction he feels in the aforementioned scene is multiplied 
when achieved in the context of an urban riot, the nearest approximation to frontline 
combat available to the peacetime fascist. To the fascist mind, ‘Masse’ is a term of 
abuse. It is the natural state of the Bolshevik, an uncontrollable (which is to say 
unleadable), flood-like force, diametrically opposed to ‘Rasse’.19 The association of 
masses with fluidity implies their ‘femininity’, and in this respect the fascist shares the 
fears of the bourgeois, whose ‘safe’ urban territory had, in the previous hundred years, 
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been the site of mass proletarian expansion. As Andreas Huyssen observes, this fear of 
an ‘engulfing femininity’ may be understood primarily as the fear of ‘the loss of identity 
and stable ego boundaries in the mass’.20 The association of the masses with 
‘barbarism’ and a lack of ‘culture’ had been lent a degree of intellectual credibility by 
Gustave Le Bon’s influential work Psychologie des Foules (1895; translated as The 
Crowd). The success of Le Bon’s text undoubtedly derived as much from his affirmation 
of the élitist, racist, and sexist values of the affluent European conservative as from his 
psychological insights. He writes: ‘Isolated, [a person] may be a cultivated individual; in 
a crowd he is a barbarian - that is, a creature acting by instinct’.21 A few pages on he 
makes explicit the link between this ‘creature’ of ‘instinct’ and femininity.22 Only in 
isolation, then, can this precariously constructed masculinity maintain integrity. Thus we 
read of Lohse, in an echo of Le Bon’s sentiments: ‘Den einzelnen hätte er vielleicht 
verstanden, in der Menge aber gab es keine Kontur, keinen bleibenden Punkt. Alles 
schwankte und schwamm’ (W, IV, 115). The verbs in the latter sentence provide an 
implicit contrast to the ‘phallic’ stance of the soldier. The imagery in the following needs 
no comment: ‘Erst als er vor dem Major Pauli stand, straffte sich der Schlaffgewordene, 
[...] und mit schneller Sorgfalt raffte er alle Kräfte zusammen und machte sie einem 
einzigen Zweck nur dienstbar: der militärischen Strammheit’ (W, IV, 95). It is when this 
‘stramm’ assertion of masculinity falters or comes under threat that the fascist is most 
dangerous. An unregimented, amorphous crowd, without a charismatic leader, 
represents a direct threat to the hemmed-in ‘Körpermaschine’, and his automatic 
reaction is to penetrate, to attack, to destroy. When plunged with his troop of young 
paramilitaries into a full-scale street battle with protesting workers Lohse momentarily 
shows weakness when he flees from a worker, who apparently knows the truth about 
the death of Günther, whom Klitsche murdered immediately prior to his own death at 
Lohse’s hands. He compensates for this ‘disgrace’ by indulging in an horrifying period of 
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gleeful slaughter, in doing so reaching an ecstatic state close to a ‘black-out’, and 
similar to those described and glorified by Jünger (Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis 
(1922)).23 Given the orgiastic horror described in the following quotation, in which the 
narrator employs the historical present, as do Jünger, Ernst von Salomon and others in 
their autobiographical accounts of combat, reference to a form of ‘verwandelter Eros’ 
does not seem far-fetched: ‘Den Gewehrkolben stößt er gegen Leichen. Er schmettert 
die Waffe gegen tote Schädel. Sie bersten. Verwundete tritt er mit den Absätzen. Er tritt 
die Gesichter, die Bäuche, die schlaff hängenden Hände. Er nimmt Rache an den 
Toten, sie wollen nicht sterben’ (W, IV, 127).24 The suggestion that he considers his 
actions to be ‘Rache’ is interesting. The reference to ‘die schlaff hängenden Hände’ 
provides an indication of what he has to avenge. They are, perhaps, a visual 
provocation to him, a symbolic reminder of the non-erect, submissive, indefinable being 
within him. Merely killing the owner of the hands is not a solution, for the hands are 
‘schlaff’ precisely because the owner is dead or unconscious. The only option for Lohse 
is the total obliteration of the dead, the violation of physically non-threatening corpses 
until they ‘bersten’: quite literally ‘overkill’. This explains the apparently paradoxical 
assertion that the ‘Toten’ will not ‘sterben’. In Lohse’s eyes a corpse is not truly ‘dead’ 
until it has been obliterated. Only then does it present no psychic threat whatsoever and 
his own ‘Strammheit’ is restored. This is the ‘Sieg der Ordnung’ (W, IV, 128, 129) on a 
psychological level which allows Lohse’s restoration as a man of influence.  
Of course, the process is inherently paradoxical, for in reducing the other to a 
bloody mess he is simultaneously affirming the existence of precisely that which he 
wishes to deny. Foucault observes that the army imposes what he terms an 
‘instrumental coding of the body’, that is an ideal symbiosis between the disciplined 
body and, say, a rifle. The distinction between the two is broken down: ‘Over the whole 
surface of contact between the body and the object it handles, power is introduced, 
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fastening them one to another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine 
complex’.25 Though it is not made explicit, the reference to power is important, as are 
the frequent references in his work to the ‘coercion’ of the body, for they imply a 
tension, an unnaturalness to such a relationship which may prevent it being maintained 
in the long term. Theweleit suggests that the fascist takes pleasure in the fact that he 
(his body) has remained intact after combat, unlike that of the ‘other’. Yet this must be a 
very superficial consolation for an act in which there seems to be a strong element of 
‘self-negation’: ‘the avowal of what is vigorously denied’.26 Jacques Lacan, writing of 
what he terms the ‘paranoia of self-punishment’, in which a murder victim paradoxically 
represents an externalised ‘Ich-Ideal’ for the murderer, describes a similar process: 
 
The madman wants to impose the law of his heart on what appears to him as the 
disorder of the world, a “mad” enterprise [...] in that [...] the subject does not 
recognise in the world’s disorder the very manifestation of his present being, and 
insofar as what he feels to be the law of his heart is only the image, both inverted 
and virtual, of that same being.27 
 
For ‘Ordnung’ ever to be wholly established, then, the fascist must destroy himself. The 
momentary pleasure of seeing another destroyed cannot compensate for the 
subconscious awareness of his own body’s vulnerability. We might compare this with 
the fate of the officer in Kafka’s well-known tale In der Strafkolonie (1919), who 
masochistically anticipates in the spectacle of other men’s agonies his own ultimate 
exposure and ‘martyrdom’. When he places himself upon his killing machine he finds 
that the ‘disorder of the world’, which he believed would be controlled and removed by 
the machine and the totalitarian system which produced it, is a part of him. The 
machine reflects this and malfunctions. The self-destructive impossibility of the National 
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Socialists’ programme upon gaining power - including the ultimate ‘mad enterprise’, the 
Holocaust - may also be understood as the vain attempt to impose ‘order’ on what 
seemed (to a disordered mind) to lack it. If this interpretation seems extreme, consider 
Zygmunt Bauman’s depressing yet illuminating contention that the genocides 
perpetrated by National Socialism and Stalinism, with their pseudo-scientific 
justifications, should not be viewed as aberrations, counter to the spirit of ‘progress’ as 
its has been understood at least since the Enlightenment, but as the ‘legitimate 
offspring of the modern spirit, of that urge to assist and speed up the progress of 
mankind toward the perfection that was throughout the most prominent hallmark of the 
modern age.’28 Elias Canetti would seem to agree: ‘Es ist etwas Mörderisches in der 
Ordnung: nichts soll da leben, wo man es nicht erlaubt hat.’29 
Franz Tunda, in Die Flucht ohne Ende and Nikolai Brandeis, in Rechts und 
Links, are also capable of killing with little hesitation. Indeed, there in fact exists a 
remarkable parallel between Lohse’s association of killing with ‘revenge’ and a similar 
application of the word to the actions of the non-committal revolutionary Tunda. 
Claiming that he is fighting for the Red Army in the Russian Civil War only because he 
believes he is in love with the idealistic revolutionary Natascha, Tunda orders the 
execution of an orthodox priest and five farmers who are accused of murdering Red 
Army soldiers. They only stand accused of the crime, yet Tunda does not hesitate. 
Further: ‘Ihre Leichen ließ er zur Abschreckung liegen. Er haßte noch die Toten. Er 
nahm persönlich Rache an ihnen’ (W, IV, 405). Like Lohse, Tunda considers his action 
to be ‘Rache’.30 This is clearly not a political action and needs some explanation. 
Tunda is participating in the Revolution quite by chance, having been caught up 
in it whilst crossing Russia on his way back to Vienna from Siberia, where as a captured 
Austrian soldier he had been imprisoned before escaping. The function of the 
Revolution for him is indicated by his adoption of the pseudonym Baranowicz. This is an 
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attempt to deny or cast off his former identity. Whereas Lohse is only able to ‘lose’ 
himself in the ecstatic frenzy of combat, Tunda uses the revolution, literally an 
overturning of the past, to achieve something similar for longer periods. It is not a 
political ‘cause’ for him but rather a suspension or reversal of accepted values. 
Revolution, with its associated violence, functions psychologically as a ‘carnivalesque’ 
state, in Bakhtinian terminology, which may be linked again to Foucault’s identification 
of the festival as a form of ‘heterotopia’. Unlike the ‘crisis heterotopia’ of the military or 
the prison discussed above, Foucault conceives of carnivals, festivals and fairgrounds 
as sites linked to temporality, ‘to time in its most fleeting, transitory, precarious 
aspect’.31 In other words, the pleasure of these heterotopias (which he compares with 
contemporary ‘vacation villages’) is that nothing - identities, roles, commitments - is 
permanent or ‘real’. The danger for participants, though, is that one’s actions may have 
very permanent effects, and that the desire for the festival never to end must lead to 
disappointment. Roth’s texts reflect both the appeal of revolution and its inherent 
dangers. 
In 1926 Roth had travelled extensively for the Frankfurter Zeitung in Russia and 
others of the new republics, and his articles about the Soviet state two years after the 
death of Lenin and five years after the introduction of the New Economic Policy 
represent a high-point in his career as a political journalist. Writing of the decidedly un-
revolutionary culture of nouveau riche ‘NEP’ men and ‘American’ technophilia, he 
remarks: 
 
Wenn bei uns eine alte und, wie man sagt: müde Kultur durch Girls, 
Faschismus, flache Romantik pathologisch banal wird, so wird hier eine eben 
erst geweckte, brutal kräftige Welt gesund banal. Unserer dekadenten Banalität 
steht gegenüber die neurussische, frische, rotbackige Banalität. (W, II, 630) 
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Brutality and strength, two qualities central to a discourse of masculinity associated with 
fascism but still current in popular culture today, are here dissociated from the ‘old’ 
world of capitalist bourgeois society of which in Roth’s view fascism is a part. It would 
seem he is referring to the Revolution here not as a political change (which is also 
considered banal) but as an exhilarating bloodletting of old values, old truths, old 
selves. This is precisely how it functions for the characters I am concerned with in Die 
Flucht ohne Ende and Rechts und Links.  
 The Revolution allows Tunda to exist in a state of flux, of constantly changing 
impressions of great intensity: ‘Er liebte die Revolution und Natascha wie ein Ritter, er 
kannte die Sümpfe, das Fieber, die Cholera, den Hunger, den Typhus, die Baracke 
ohne Arznei, den Geschmack des verschimmelten Brotes’ (W, IV, 406). He gains a 
degree of satisfaction from transforming himself, from playing the role of revolutionary 
leader. This is in contrast to Theodor Lohse, for whom the desire to lead, to be seen as 
a ‘Gefahr’, is a primary motivation. Violence is a necessity to Lohse, the mutilation and 
destruction of another an erotic and fulfilling experience. When Franz Tunda kills or 
orders people to be killed, however, he seems to do so dispassionately, feeling neither 
desire nor regret. In the temporality and flux of the Revolution (precisely the chaotic 
state Lohse fears despite achieving a parallel state of self-loss in combat) the obligation 
to relate to others as individuals is lifted, as is all sense of moral responsibility. Thus 
Tunda is willing to kill, ‘ohne zu wollen’ (W, IV, 405). Why then does he ‘hate’ the dead? 
I would suggest that the permanence of the dead, as concrete evidence of an 
irreversible action, is what Tunda hates. He does not regret killing individual humans - 
indeed as his fantasy-based relationships with women indicate, he seems unable to 
relate to others as individuals - but resents their physicality as a reminder that he has 
made a difference to the world. We might relate this to his subsequent reluctance to 
participate in the relatively banal work of building up a workable (i.e. permanent) state in 
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Russia, or to Nikolai Brandeis’s similar fear of the physical trappings of success in 
Rechts und Links: ‘“Glauben Sie mir, der Generaldirektor gehört seiner Tafel, seiner 
Visitkarte [sic], seiner Rolle, seiner Stellung, der Furcht, die er verbreitet, den 
Gehältern, die er bewilligt, den Kündigungen, die er ausspricht; nicht umgekehrt!”’ (W, 
IV, 743) The dead bodies, as a ‘product’ of his action, may be considered an extension 
of Tunda’s self. In leaving them to decompose, just as Brandeis chooses to leave his 
own business empire to ‘decay’, he experiences an ersatz disintegration of the self, the 
form of ‘expenditure’ or wastefulness conceived of by Georges Bataille as a deep-
seated need in many societies and individuals.32 Tunda thus kills neither out of 
revolutionary zeal nor, as does Lohse, as a ‘lustvoll’ compulsion. However, his actions 
are the result of a general strategy of avoidance of the trappings of a conventional 
identity, the necessary price of citizenship and a life in a stable society, which leaves 
him ‘überflüssig wie [...] niemand in der Welt’ (W, IV, 496) at the text’s conclusion. In 
this respect Lohse’s lust for power, as a means of controlling society rather than 
submitting to it, is merely an alternative strategy of avoidance to that adopted by Tunda. 
In the structurally and formally uneven novel Rechts und Links Nikolai Brandeis 
is not introduced as the novel’s central character. However, as his power in the story 
increases so the narrator (a first person narrator whom Roth seems to forget about after 
the first paragraph) tends to focus upon him. By the end his disappearance from Berlin 
functions as a signal for closure (or at least cessation) of the narrative. Brandeis may in 
fact be considered the embodiment of Roth’s doubts at the time of writing concerning 
‘whole’ characters with consistent psychologies and life histories (see for example his 
article ‘Selbstverriß’ (1929)). Though in part a literary-theoretical issue, this is also a 
psychological point, a reflection of Roth’s conception of humans’ ability to transform 
themselves, to act in non-rational ways. Thus we read of Brandeis’s conviction that he 
is able periodically to start afresh in his life, leaving behind the ‘self’ he has previously 
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occupied: 
 
Auch Nikolai Brandeis machte die Erfahrung, daß der Mensch in einer einzigen 
Stunde - die ihm gar nicht wichtig erscheint - imstande ist, was man seinen 
“Charakter” nennt, so vollkommen zu verändern, daß er vor den Spiegel treten 
müßte, um sich zu überzeugen, daß seine Physiognomie noch die alte geblieben 
sei. Seit jener Veränderung, die er selbst erlebt hatte, pflegte Brandeis zu sagen, 
daß die Menschen sich nicht entwickeln, sondern ihr Wesen wechseln. (W, IV, 
687) 
 
Although Roth denied, for effect, that his characters had consistent psychology, we are 
provided with enough clues, as in the case of Lohse and Tunda, to make sense of this. I 
suggested above that Brandeis’s decision at the novel’s conclusion to abandon his 
lucrative business is motivated primarily by a fear of permanent ties, of being taken for 
granted. We learn that this is in fact his ‘second life’, and that he was previously a 
career soldier in Russia, first in the Imperial, then in the Red Army. The career the army 
provided was, as it was for Lohse, primarily one of discipline and security, replacing the 
need to establish a personal identity. His behaviour during the War and the Revolution 
is motivated, one might say, not by principle but by the desire to retain the ‘wholeness’ 
the structure of the army could provide: ‘Er hatte sich vorgenommen, um jeden Preis 
Soldat zu bleiben. Mitten in der Verwirrung, die ihn nicht bekümmern sollte, war dieser 
Entschluß etwas Sicheres, und er führte auch zu etwas verhältnismäßig Sicherem’ (W, 
IV, 687). Insofar as the Red Army preserved the conventional hierarchy and leadership 
structure of other armies, this behaviour is entirely consistent with that of the 
‘soldatischer Mann’ as described by Theweleit: Brandeis does what he has to do to 
avoid ‘Verwirrung’. Where he differs is in his attitude to violence. Like Tunda, he is quite 
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capable of following orders and killing men if it helps preserve the ‘Sicherheit’ of his 
lifestyle, but, again like Tunda, he derives no pleasure from it. Theweleit argues that the 
fascist’s ‘Körperpanzer’, the root of his dysfunctional behaviour, has literally been 
beaten into him - through the brutal regimes of Wilhelmine schools and military 
academies. Neither Tunda nor Brandeis has undergone quite such a schooling, and 
their behaviour patterns are correspondingly different. Brandeis’s far less developed 
‘shell’ is penetrated when he carries out an order, like Tunda, to execute a priest: 
 
Nun aber, da die Leiche des Pfarrers, der kniend gestorben war, 
vornübergesunken vor der blau gekalkten Mauer lag, vor der Mauer, auf der 
Nikolai als Knabe so oft rittlings gesessen hatte, und die dunkelrote Blutlache 
zaghaft immer größer wurde und auf dem abschüssigen Boden zwischen die 
Fugen der unregelmäßigen Steine ein paar Bächlein vorzuschicken begann: In 
dieser Minute verwandelte sich Brandeis. Er nahm die Mütze ab in Anblick der 
ganzen Bevölkerung und machte eine Verbeugung vor der Leiche. (W, IV, 688-
689) 
 
The moment has religious overtones, perhaps anticipating a theme more apparent in a 
later novel of the Russian Revolution and Civil War, Tarabas, in which a violent man 
becomes repentant of his sins. Certainly, Roth was well aware of the connotations of 
the notion of ‘Wiedergeburt’. Yet Brandeis’s subsequent career as an entrepreneur in 
Berlin is characterised not by the humility of the repentant sinner but by amorality and 
an insistence upon distance from others. This suggests that his ‘Verwandlung’ is not 
explicable within the clichéd framework of the sinner/saint dialectic, which some critics 
have suggested is a hallmark of Roth’s work. The contrast onomastically implicit in 
Brandeis’s name does not symbolise a struggle between good and evil but rather an 
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internal struggle between competing identities: ‘“Wieviel bist du? Bist du einer?” fragte 
er. “Ich bin zehn!”’ (W, IV, 689) His transformation is psychological rather than ethical. It 
is interesting, for example, that Brandeis associates the wall in front of which the 
execution takes place with his own childhood. His memory of his childhood self, whose 
presence is suggested by the location, provides Brandeis with a convenient 
representation of the otherness of his own ego. As Lacan stresses, the ego can in any 
case never be directly ‘felt’ or ‘experienced’, having been formed from one’s image in 
the mirror at an early stage. If the ego in some sense always remains an object it can of 
course, in extreme cases, be projected onto other objects of our subjective gaze. 
Something of this nature takes place in the soldier whose sense of self is intimately 
bound up with his unit, and on a larger scale with the entire army, and who is 
surrounded on a daily basis by uniform(ed) ‘doubles’. Projection of oneself onto an 
object is, however, likely to produce contradictory feelings. Discussing Lacan, Borch-
Jacobsen writes that it is quite possible to: 
 
run up against that hard, frozen “object” that I am and am not, that I am not all 
the while I am ravished in it. So [...] I will be able to meet myself, run into myself 
in mirrors, struggle with my doubles, love myself in them while hating myself, 
project myself into them while losing myself.33 
 
For Brandeis, gazing at the priest with the concentration of the executioner and 
imagining simultaneously his childhood self, the condemned man becomes himself, a 
double, an extension of an ego previously placed ‘in the service of the machine’ (the 
military).34 This helps explain the fascination with the pool of blood, a phenomenon 
documented by Theweleit as a common one for soldiers and reminiscent of Lohse’s 
intense interest in the ‘product’ of his murderous aggression in the forest. It is as though 
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Brandeis is staring at his own blood, that he has executed himself, leaving - in logical 
extension - another person in his place. His behaviour thereafter is motivated by the 
knowledge that, in one sense, he has seen himself die, that he is a ‘ghost’ walking 
amongst the living, both superior and inferior simultaneously. Wolf Marchand observes 
that many of Roth’s figures undergo some sort of transforming ‘rebirth’, though without 
examining the psychological mechanisms which allow this, and attempts to relate it to 
his apparent adoption of topoi of fascistic discourse.35 Hitler, according to Hans Jochen 
Gamm’s analysis of the cult elements in National Socialism, recognised the power of 
presenting himself as simultaneously dead and alive, as human and god. Brandeis’s 
experience echoes this, however, not so much as part of an underlying discourse 
related to that of Blut und Boden literature but as a representation of the displaced ego 
of the career soldier reaching a crisis point and undergoing a surrogate ‘death’. As 
becomes clear in his relationship to Lydia Markowna, an actress he literally purchases 
as a sort of concubine and treats as an object, Brandeis pays a heavy price for his 
‘rebirth’: the ability to relate to other people. 
The link between masculinity and violence is not absolute in Roth’s work, but 
rather present only under particular conditions - a dangerous cocktail of military training, 
frontline combat experience, and social and political instability. Marchand contends that 
Roth ‘erliegt dem Reiz’ of male characters whose psychology he had portrayed, in Das 
Spinnennetz, as negative.36 It is true that there are parallels between the behaviour of 
Lohse and that of the later characters. Theodor Lohse’s attempt at a wholesale ‘Sieg 
der Ordnung’ - the violent assault on the ‘other’ within oneself - is partially mirrored in 
the individual acts of violence performed by Roth’s revolutionary characters. Marchand’s 
assertion ignores, however, the price they must pay for the brutality they direct at the 
world of permanent values and identities, and their inability to integrate into society. In 
later texts set in the period of ‘satter, behäbiger, übermütiger Frieden’ (W, VI, 417) 
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before World War I, as it is described in Die Geschichte von der 1002. Nacht (1939), 
the controlling and stable social hierarchy is seemingly permanent, and narrative 
closure is achievable in the literal or symbolic self-destruction of the flawed male 
protagonist. In the earlier texts the opposite is the case. Confrontation with one’s own 
ego is constantly deferred, and the texts are not resolved by death but by dislocation - 
from oneself and the world. The texts can and should be read, then, as cautionary tales 
of the lasting psychological damage inflicted by military training and warfare, and of the 
consequences of an archetypally masculine employment of violence and evasion as 
solutions to a problem. In an age of technology-dominated wars and widespread 
desensitisation to violence, they retain their relevance. 
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